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Abstract 
With increasing delays and airport congestion that disturb airline operations, the development 
of robust schedules is becoming crucial. Increased traffic and poor weather are a few of the 
causes of airport congestion, rising delays and lengthening passenger trips. In this thesis, we 
identify the latest trend in the flight arrival and departure delays, differentiating major U.S. 
airports from other smaller airports. We also quantify the types of delays airlines should work 
to mitigate. We then analyze the effects of schedules changes that were implemented by a 
major U.S. airline at their largest hub. We measure the effects of these schedule changes on 
on-time performance, taxi time, plane utilization, and passenger connection and total travel 
time. We also analyze how extensive is the practice of adding buffer time to flight times to 
improve schedule reliability. Finally, we propose and implement a new model to achieve 
robust crew schedules, that is, crew schedules that are less likely to be inoperable due to 
disruptions during operations. We show that with an increase in crew costs of 0.2%, we can 
decrease the number of times crews must connect between different aircraft by 32%. 
Thesis Supervisor: Cynthia Barnhart 
Title: Professor, Civil and Environmental Engineering and Engineering Systems 

Acknowledgements 
First, I would like to thank my thesis advisor Prof. Cynthia Barnhart. Our discussions were a 
great help for me to improve my work and develop my ideas. It has been a great joy to work 
with her. I would also like to address many thanks to Prof. Richard Dudley for his help in the 
statistical analysis, his passion for statistics and his very kind support along the year. 
Many thanks to Curt Horjn, Stefan Karish and Martin Sorensen from Carmen Systems. Their 
help and enthusiasm has been great support to discover and utilize the Carmen Crew pairing 
software. 
Then, I would like to thank my Rotary host counselor Ted Van Nahl and all the Rotary people 
I met in the US through my ambassadorial scholarship that supported me through the first 
semester. 
Many thanks to all my friends at M U  and Harvard. I spent a wonderful year in the US and 
made so many great experiences with you. I thank my parents, my sisters and friends left in 
France. Their mental support was a great help. 
Last but not least, special thanks to Katharina for a lundness and love that helped me to 
succeed. 

Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction ...................................................................................... 13 
1.1 The importance of delays ........................................................................................ 13 
1.2 Responses of the Airlines ..................................................................................... 14 
..................................................................................... 1.3 Crew scheduling robustness 15 
1 . 3 . 1 . Definitions ......................................................................................................... 15 
1 . 3 . 2 . Robustness ............................................................................................................ 15 
1.4 Thesis Objectives and Contributions ....................................................................... 16 
........................................................................................................... 1.5 Thesis Outline 16 
................................................................. Chapter 2 Analysis of airline delays 17 
.............................................................................................................. 2.1 Introduction 17 
2.2 Definition of the Causes of delays ........................................................................... 17 
2 . 2 . 1 . The airlines' point of view ................................................................................. 17 
2 . 2 . 2 . The Bureau of Transportation's point of view ..................................................... 21 
2 . 2 . 3 . Composition of NAS delays ............................................................................... 23 
2 . 3 . Evolutions of delays .................................................................................................... 25 
2 . 3 . 1 . Industry trend .................................................................................................. 25 
2 . 3 . 2 . Seasonal variations ............................................................................................. 26 
2 . 3 . 3 . Variations during the day ..................................................................................... 28 
.............................................................................................. 2 . 4 . Delays at Major Airports 29 
2 . 4 . 1 . On-time performance ...................................................................................... 2 9  
2 . 4 . 2 . Taxi-time ............................................................................................................. 29 
2 . 4 . 3 . NAS delays ........................................................................................................... 30 
2 . 5 . Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 31 
Chapter 3 Delta Airline's De-banking of Atlanta Hartsfield Airport ............... 33 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 33 
3.1.1. Banking and de-banking the major hubs ................................................................ 33 
3.1.2. Characteristics of the Atlanta Airport ..................................................................... 34 
3.1.3.. Airport runway capacity ........................................................................................ 35 
3.2 Overview of schedule changes ................................................................................ 3 5  
3 . 2 . 1 . Characteristics of schedule changes ..................................................................... 35 
3 . 2 . 2 . Comparison with other Delta hubs ....................................................................... 37 
3.3 Analysis of the effects of de-peaking on airport delays ........................................... 39 
3 . 3 . 1 . Methodology ........................................................................................................ 39 
3 . 3 . 2 . On-time departures ............................................................................................... 40 
3 . 3 . 3 . Taxi-out at Atlanta ................................................................................................ 41 
3 . 3 . 4 . Importance of meeting airport capacity ............................................................... 42 
3 . 3 . 5 . On-time arrivals at ATL ....................................................................................... 44 
3.4 Comparison with other de-banking experiments ...................................................... 45 
.......................................................................................................... 3 . 4 . 1 . Comparison 45 
3 . 4 . 2 . Who is next? ......................................................................................................... 45 
3 . 5 . Conclusion .................................................................................................................. 46 
Chapter 4 Addition of buffer time ..................................................................... 49 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................. -49 
4.2 Block Time Comparisons ........................................................................................ 4 9  
4 . 2 . 1 . Example of Atlanta-Dallas ................................................................................... 49 
4 . 2 . 2 . Analysis ............................................................................................................... 50 
4 . 2 . 3 . Calculation of the gate-to-gate time ..................................................................... 54 
4.3 Practices of timetable modification .......................................................................... 55 
4 . 3 . 1 . Introduction .......................................................................................................... 55 
4 . 3 . 2 . Linear regression (base case: Least Square Fit) .................................................. 56 
4 . 3 . 3 . Robust regressions (by erasing the outliers) ......................................................... 58 
4 . 3 . 4 . Least Trimmed Squares Robust Regression (LTS Regression) ........................... 58 
4 . 3 . 5 . Robust MM Linear Regression ............................................................................ 60 
4 . 3 . 6 . Comparison Robust MM Linear Regression versus LS fit .................................. 62 
4.4. Application to different airlines .............................................................................. -62 
4 . 4 . 1 . Method .................................................................................................................. 62 
4 . 4 . 2 . Results .................................................................................................................. 62 
4.5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 6 3  
Chapter 5 Implementation of a robust crew scheduling model ........................ 65 
5.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 65 
5 . 2 . Review of crew pairing models ............................................................................... 66 
5 . 2 . 1 . Generic Crew Pairing Model ................................................................................ 66 
5 . 2 . 2 . Bi-criteria approach ............................................................................................ 6 7  
5 . 2 . 3 . Maximizing Short Connect Utilization ................................................................ 69 
5 . 2 . 4 . Integrated Robust Routing and Crew Model ........................................................ 71 
5.3 Implementation ........................................................................................................ 7 4  
5 . 3 . 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 74 
5 . 3 . 2 . Implementation of the "Maximization of the short connects" model .................. 78 
5 . 3 . 3 . Implementation of the Agbokou model ................................................................ 82 
5 . 3 . 4 . Conclusions ......................................................................................................... 85 
Chapter 6 Conclusions ...................................................................................... 87 
6.1. Summary ................................................................................................................. 87 
6.2. Future Research ........................................................................................................ 89 
List of Figures 
........................... Figure 1 . 1. Decomposition of the monthly schedule in pairings and duties 15 
................................. Figure 2.1 : Delay categories by minutes (Major Airline. Jan - June05) 19 
. ........................ Figure 2.2. Delay categories by reports (Major Airline. Jan - June 2005) 19 
............................. Figure 2.3. Average delay per report among the different categories 21 
........................... Figure 2.4. The causes of the disrupted flights (June 2003-June 2005) 22 
........................... Figure 2.5. The causes of the disrupted flights (June 2003-June 2005) 24 
Figure 2.6. Departure and arrival delays for the first semester of the year (1998.2005) ........ 25 
Figure 2.7. Taxi-out time for US domestic flights .................................................................... 26 
........................................................ Figure 2.8. Seasonal arrival delays variations 27 
........................................................... Figure 2.9. Seasonal cancellation variation 27 
Figure 2.10. Summary of the evolution throughout the day of flight delays, by category ...... 28 
Figure 2.1 1 : Comparison of the on-time performance (June 2003-May 2005) .................. 29 
.................................................................. Figure 2.12. Difference in taxi times 30 
.................. Figure 2.13. Difference of NAS delays between Major Airport and the others 31 
...................................................... Figure 3.1. Traffic in terms of number of pax 35 
....................................................................... Figure 3.2 Repartition of the pax 35 
Figure 3.3. Aircraft movements of Delta mainline in January 2005 at Atlanta .................. 36 
Figure 3.4. Aircraft movements of Delta mainline in February 2005 at Atlanta ................... 36 
Figure 3.5. Delta mainline aircraft movements in February 2005 at Cincinnati ................. 37 
Figure 3.6. Delta mainline aircraft movements in February 2005 at Salt Lake City ............ 38 
Figure 3.7. Number of departures per day ............................................................ 39 
Figure 3.8. Taxi-out time as a function of departure from the Gate ................................. 42 
Figure 3.9 Schedule before ....................................................................................................... 43 
Figure 3.10. Operated at gate before ......................................................................................... 43 
Figure 3.1 1 Take-off time before ....................................................................... 43 
...................................................................................................... Figure 3.12. Schedule after 43 
Figure 3.13 On-time arrivals in Atlanta ................................................................ 44 
Figure 3.14 Airtran schedule at Atlanta ................................................................ 47 
Figure 4.1. Density function of actual time gate to gate (ATL-DFW) in February 2005 ....... 50 
Figure 4.2. Block Time of the flights departing from Atlanta to Dallas .......................... .50 
Figure 4.3. Time gate to gate (bold) versus scheduled time .......................................... 51 
Figure 4.4. Taxi-in time of American Airline Flights ATL-DFW in February 2005 .......... 51 
........................... Figure 4.5. Taxi-in time of Delta Flights ATL-DFW in February 2005 52 
.......................... Figure 4.6. Taxi-in time of Airtran Flights ATL-DFW in February 2005 52 
Figure 4.7. On-time amval in Dallas performance ................................................... 53 
Figure 4.8. Airtime needed between ATL and DFW ................................................ 54 
Figure 4.9. Taxi-out time in February for all the flights departing from Atlanta ................. 55 
Figure 4.10 Linear regressions between arrivals and departures delays ........................... 56 
Figure 4.1 1 Residuals of the linear regression between arrival and departures delays ......... 57 
Figure 4.12 Standardized LTS Residuals versus Fit .................................................. 59 
Figure 4.13 Robust MM regression ................................................................... -61 
Figure 5.1. Definitions of the different times in Ehrgott's and Ryan's model ................... 68 
Figure 5.2. Illustration of maximizing short connection ............................................. 69 
......................................................................... Figure 5.3. Definition of a critical connection -72 
Figure 5.4. Composition of the American Airline fleet ............................................................ 75 
...................... Figure 5.5. Geographic plot of the flights legs and destinations of the fleet 76 
Figure 5.6. Screen shot of Carmen Crew Pairing optimizer ........................................ 77 
........................... Figure 5.7. Trade off between aircraft changes and crew cost increase 80 
Figure 5.8. Correlation between decrease in aircraft changes and increase in 1-leg duty ........ 81 
Figure 5.9. Five different Penalty shapes ............................................................... 82 
Figure 5.10. Number and length of critical connections used, for varying penalty function ... 83 
Figure 5.1 1: Number of Flight legs in duty after a Critical Connection ................................... 84 
List of Tables 
.................................................... Table 3.1. Overview of the flights change in ATL 37 
............................................................... Table 3.2. Degree of peaking of Delta's hub airports 38 
............................................. Table 3.3. Variation of on-time departure percentages -40 
...................................................... Table 3.4 Average Taxi-out Times (in minutes) 41 
.................................................................... Table 3.5. Comparison of performance indicators 45 
................................................................ Table 3.6. Airport ranking by number of operations 46 
Table 4.1. Mean value in minutes for ATL-DFW flights in February 2005 ............................ 51 
Table 4.2. Carrier performances at Dallas ............................................................................... -53 
...................................................................................... Table 4.3. Causes of Delays at Dallas -54 
.............................................. Table 4.1. Coefficients for the linear regression of jetBlue data 56 
................................................................... Table 4.2. Comparison of the Robust Regressions 58 
................................................ Table 4.3. Coefficients for the LTS regression of jetBlue data 59 
.......................... Table 4.4. Coefficients for the MM Robust regression of jetBlue data 61 
Table 4.2. Comparison of the coefficients of the regressions ................................................... 62 
.......... Table 4.6. Buffer time (in minutes) practice for different airlines in January in Boston 62 
Table 4.7. Mean distance .......................................................................................................... 63 
Table 5.1. Delays and cancellations for the US domestic flights in 2004 ........................ 72 
.............................................................. Table 5.2. Comparison and Adaptation of the models 78 
........................................... Table 5.3. Crew cost and Aircraft change in the weekly problem -79 
Table 5.4. : Aircraft changes, shorts connects and number of legs per duty ............................ 80 

Chapter 1 
Introduction 
The crew scheduling problem is the last sub-problem to be solved in the Airline Schedule 
Planning Process. After defining the flight schedule, assigning aircraft types to the flight legs 
in the schedule, and routing individual aircraft to routinely visit maintenance stations, the 
final task in the Airline Schedule Planning Process is to ensure that every flight leg is covered 
by a crew and that total crew cost is minimized. The crew scheduling problem consists of two 
sub-problems, the Crew Pairing Problem to generate (partial) crew schedules, or pairings, that 
minimize crew costs and assign each flight leg to a single crew, and the Crew Rostering or 
Bidline Problem to assemble the selected crew pairings into month-long schedules. 
1.1 The importance of delays 
Recent indicators show that delays are rising again to the previous record levels experienced 
in 2000, so it is crucial that we to better understand their origins and how they propagate 
through the schedule so that we can reduce them. The majority of delays that disturb the 
airline schedule are created by external factors, such as, weather or airport and airspace 
congestion). However, some of the delays are created by hot spots in the airline process, or 
ineffective scheduling of aircraft, crew members or passengers. By identifying patterns of 
these types of delays that occur repeatedly, we believe that capturing their effects at the 
planning stage can lead to potentially significant reductions in delay during operations. 
Our motivation stems from the fact that even a small reduction in delays can have an 
important impact on the airlines, in terms of their operations, image and financial results. 
Indeed, on-time performance has become one of the most important key performance 
indicators in the airline industry and an important service differentiator for customers, 
especially for valuable, high-yield customers. Booz Allen & Hamilton [6] estimate that 
airlines lose 0.6% to up to as much as 2.9% of their operating revenues as a result of delays 
Therefore, achieving even a small improvement in on-time performance through 
consideration of the delays during the planning process can potentially produce significant 
results. 
1.2 Responses of the Airlines 
Unlike Europe, where each airport is allocated a finite number of slots based on Instrument 
Flight Rules (IFR) conditions, all but 4 US airports allow airlines to schedule their flights, 
without any restrictions. As a result, sometimes the number of scheduled flights per unit of 
time exceeds the capacity of the airport. This inevitably results in airport congestion and 
delays, even in good weather conditions. 
In their quest for on-time performance, airlines have adopted different means to reduce the 
delays they experience. At major airports that are often used as a hub by an airline, the 
dominant carrier can improve the situation for itself and all other carriers by de-banking its 
schedule. It requires giving up the common practice of operating a group of arrivals followed 
shortly by group of departures, in order that customers experience short connection times. By 
spreading its flights over the day, the dominant camer can significantly improve operations at 
the airport. We'll study in this thesis the benefits resulting from the hub de-banlung of a 
legacy carrier. 
A second response of airlines to increases in delays is to add time into the schedule and 
incorporate into gate-to-gate time both air and taxi delays. This practice improves on-time 
performance directly. We'll study the policies of airlines and the quantities of buffer time they 
add to guarantee robustness of their operations. 
Crew scheduling robustness 
1. 3.1. Definitions 
A monthly crew schedule is composed of multiple pairings. A pairing is a sequence of duties 
that start and end at the same crew base. A duty is a set of flight legs covered by a crew in a 
day. Solving the crew scheduling problem involves finding a set of feasible crew pairings that 
cover all of the flights and minimizes crew costs while respecting the many rules imposed by 
the FAA or by regulatory and collective bargaining agreements. Some of the common rules 
include restrictions on the minimum and maximum connection time between two consecutive 
flights in a duty, the minimum and maximum rest time between duties in a pairing, and the 
number of duties in a pairing, etc. The cost of a pairing is usually the maximum of three 
quantities: the sum of the duty costs in the pairing, a fraction of the time away from base and 
a minimum guaranteed pay times the number of duties (Barnhart et a1 [3]) .  
Duty period 1 &Y 
Monthly 
Schedule Irnd 
Figure 1.1: Decomposition of the monthly schedule in pairings and duties 
1 . 3 . 2 .  Robustness 
During operations, the assumption that every flight will be flown as planned and that every 
aircraft will arrive and depart on-time is erroneous. As a consequence, the realized cost of 
plans are greater, sometimes much greater, than those planned. Klabjan and Cherbalov [ 1 11 
estimate that "the crew cost at the end of the month can be up to five times larger than the 
planned crew cost obtained by the optimal crew schedule". To decrease these additional crew 
costs, airlines can either use better recovery procedures or develop more robust crew 
scheduling solutions. In this thesis, we consider the second approach. By adding more slack 
to the crew pairing solution and allocating it wisely, we conjecture that solutions can be 
obtained that perform better during operations and achieve lower realized crew costs. 
1.4 Thesis Objectives and Contributions 
The objective of this thesis is to enhance crew pairing optimization models to capture the 
causes and effects of delays. We evaluate recent trends in delays, and airline responses to 
mitigate them, including de-banlung of major hubs and adding buffer times to flight times. 
Lastly, we implement two robust crew scheduling models and discuss, for each model, the 
trade-off between robustness and crew costs. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organized as follows. In chapter 2, we quantify the extent of flight delays in the 
US at the end of the first quarter of 2005. We use key performance indicators to measure the 
changes in delays and identify patterns of delay at major airports. In chapter 3, we analyze the 
effects of de-banking Delta's Atlanta hub, measuring delays and levels of congestion. In 
chapter 4, we analyze the effects of another common airline practice, that of adding buffer 
time to the schedule. We compare the policies of different airlines and their accomplishments 
in improving their on-time performance. 
Finally, after reviewing robust scheduling models that are designed specifically to decrease 
delay propagation, we implement two models using the RAVE optimizer developed by 
Carmen Systems [7]. We then conclude with a short discussion of the trade-off between 
robustness and crew costs, and we suggest some new paths for research. 
Chapter 2 
Analysis of airline delays 
2.1 Introduction 
Flight delays and cancellations occur daily during airline operations. They have a direct 
impact on aircraft routes and crew schedules that might be disrupted or broken. Delays result 
from a broad range of causes. Some of them can be controlled by the airline, whereas others 
cannot. 
The aim of this chapter is to draw a general picture of delays and to extract information that 
can be employed to improve the reliability of schedules. First, we identify causes of the 
delays from the point of view of airlines and from the point of view of the US Department of 
Transportation, and we compare their viewpoints. Then we look at the evolution of delays 
from different perspectives: yearly, seasonally and daily. Finally we address the pattern of 
delays for 10% of the major airports that receive 65% of the traffic. 
2.2 Definition of the Causes of delays 
2.2.1. The airlines' point of view 
From the airlines' point of view, it is very important to identify delays and their causes. Front 
line people are responsible for reporting all delays that disturb operations. Delays are coded 
depending on their origin. The airlines use about 70 different codes to refer to all types of 
delays. 
2.2.1.1. Categories of delay 
We studed reports of a major American airline company. The delay codes are aggregated into 
9 different categories. We present a quick overview of them: 
Airport services: late loading of customers andor bags, holding for connecting 
customers and bags, seat assignment duplication, soliciting over sale volunteers, 
inadequate resources to support the operation (skycaps, ramp services, etc.. .) 
Technical services: aircraft mechanical problem, adjusting, repairing or inspecting 
an aircraft, maintenance irregularity 
Flight operations: late release from system operations, crew disruption, 
unassigned crew member, holding for a connecting crew 
Aircraft servicing: late cleaning or supplying of aircraft 
Cutering/provisioning: missing items, late provisioning, 
In-flight service: late crew to aircraft, late request for additional cabin service 
supplies, problem related to aircraft cabin where no maintenance is required. 
System: delay due to origin, enroute or destination weather, awaiting ATC 
clearance, substitution of an aircraft 
Facilities: failure of baggage system, ramps constructions interfering aircraft 
ground handling. 
Miscellaneous : damage to the aircraft discovered during a turn, failure of normal 
data processing or communications systems 
2.2.1.2. Categorization of delays 
For the first 6 months of 2005 we plotted the relative importance of these categories in 2 
ways: by their importance in minutes and in the number of reports they generated. 
These front line data are very important in identifying the hot spots of the process that create 
delays. The following page presents our findings. 
lmportance of the categories by minutes of delays 
Miscellaneous 
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Figure 2.1: Delay categories by minutes (Major Airline, Jan - JuneOS) 
lmportance of the categories by number of reports 
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Figure 2.2: Delay categories by reports (Major Airline, Jan. - June 2005) 
Figure 2.1 shows the very important role of "system" related delays (e.g., weather, heavy 
traffic, congestion at airports, lack of airspace, etc.). For this company, 70.5% of the minutes 
of delays result from the operations environment. These delays are responsible for 65% to 
74% of the total delay minutes each month, with an average of 29 minutes of delay per report, 
as shown in Figure 2.3. 
The cause of delay with the highest average number of delay minutes per report is the 
technical service category, with 42 minutes of delay per report. It refers to last-minute 
maintenance problems. Representing 5.3% of the total minutes of delay, it turns out to be the 
4th most important category behind system, airport services and flight operations. Yet, 
according to the opinion of a senior United Airlines pilot, the occurrence of maintenance 
delays is rising with the current attitude of the airline to increase outsourcing of maintenance. 
United Airlines decreased its maintenance staff from 12,000 mechanics to only 5,000 within a 
few years, and decreased the number of its maintenance stations by the same ratio. 
Outsourcing maintenance tends to make repair times longer, with potentially costly increases 
in delays. Indeed, according to La Mont [12], outsourcing heightens the risk of delays, 
because outsourced parts often have problems that need to be fixed before they can be put in 
service. Moreover, the logistics of getting the equipment to and from vendors are more 
complicated than having work done in-house. 
Figure 2.2 shows that an important number of reports of delays involves airport services, with 
an average of 9.7 minutes per report. We will discuss later how flight operations delays are 
strongly connected with the quality of the planning function. 
Average delay per report 
Airport services Technical services Aircraft servicing System Miscellaneous 
Catering Flight op In-flight service Facilities 
Figure 2.3: Average delay per report among the different categories 
2.2.2. The Bureau of Transportation's point of view 
2.2.2.1. Source of the data 
Within the US Department of Transportation, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) 
collects and tracks flight data of the major domestic airlines (with more than 1% of total 
domestic scheduled passenger revenue). The number of reporting carriers varies between 10 
(1997) and 20 (2005). The 9 major carriers present since the beginning of data collection are 
Alaska Airlines, America West Airlines, American Airlines, Continental Airlines, Delta Air 
Lines, Northwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines, United Airlines, and US Airways. Reporting 
airlines receive more than 90% of the total domestic operating revenues each year. Hence, 
we'll consider that the figures of these reports well represent airline industry trends. Later, we 
will compare this general trend to that at specific specifics airports to determine if a change in 
performance is due to better operations at the airport or just correlated with an overall 
improved performance of the entire air transportation system. The data we will use in this 
thesis is accessible at the following address: 
http://www. bts.gov/programs/airline~infonnationl 
2.2.2.2.  The BTS categories 
The BTS identifies five broad categories of delays: 
Air Carrier: Delays or cancellations attributable to the airline's operations 
(maintenance or crew problems, aircraft cleaning, baggage loading, fuelling, etc.). 
Extreme Weather: Delays or cancellations attributable to significant meteorological 
conditions (actual or forecasted) that, in the judgment of the carrier delays or prevents 
the operation of a flight (e.g. tornado, blizzard, hurricane, thunderstorm, etc.). 
National Aviation System (NAS): Delays and cancellations attributable to the National 
Aviation System that refers to a broad set of conditions that we will detail further (e. g. 
weather, ATC . . .). 
Late-arriving aircrafr: Delays are attributable to a previous flight with the same 
aircraft arriving late and causing the following flight to depart late. 
Security: Delays or cancellations caused by evacuation of a terminal or concourse, re- 
boarding of aircraft because of security breach, inoperative screening equipment 
andlor long lines in excess of 29 minutes at screening areas. 
NAS 
33.7% 
curity 
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Figure 2.4: The causes of the disrupted flights (June 2003- June 2005) 
Figure 2.4 represents the categorizations of the total number of delay minutes for the period 
(June 2003-June 2005). It identifies 3 main causes of delays: NAS delays, propagated delays 
(aircraft amving late), and air carrier delay. 
The main cause of delay with 33.7% of the total minutes of delay is the National Aviation 
System (NAS). The NAS is responsible for imposing some limits on airline traffic due to 
congestion of airspace or congestion of airports. Weather plays a very important role in these 
congestion problems. 
Propagated delays are nearly as important with 33.1% of the total delay minutes. These delays 
get more and more important as the day progresses. However, different scheduling practices 
could probably avoid some of the delay propagation and amplification throughout the day. 
The last important category, with 26.4% of the delay minutes, is carrier delays. In this 
category, the airlines can again change their schedules to decrease delays. We will review and 
propose some scheduling models in the last part of this thesis that target this objective, and 
focus on the scheduling of crews. 
2.2.3.  Composition of NAS delays 
The National Aviation System accounts for the most number of minutes of delays. NAS 
delays refer to a large number of "system" causes: non-extreme weather, heavy traffic 
volume, airport operations (equipment, closed runway), etc. 
Figure 2.5 shows the importance of weather (responsible for 77% of the NAS delay minutes). 
Overall, we estimate the importance of weather. Extreme Weather accounts for 6.6% of NAS 
delays and "normal" bad weather accounts for 77%*33.7% of NAS delays. We add the 
weather delays resulting from propagated delays (33.1%), and the weather delays resulting 
from the propagated delays of the propagated delays and so on . . . 
In total, bad weather is responsible for 48.7% of the total NAS delays: 
0 
WeatherDelay = (%WeatherInNas x % NASdelay + % Etrerne Weather) x (% ~ r o ~ a ~ a t e d ~ e l a ~ ) '  
i=O 
WeatherDelay = (%WeatherInNas x %NASdelay + % Etreme Weather) x 1 
1 - % PropagatedDelay 
The difference between Extreme Weather and Weather delay is explained by the BTS [5] .  
Weather delay corresponds to nonextreme weather delays that could be reduced with 
corrective action by the airports or the FAA. In the previous plot, extreme weather refers to 
delays that cannot be reduced by corrective action because of significant meteorological 
conditions, actual or forecasted, at the point of departure, en route, or point of arrival. 
The second interesting element that we find in the composition of the NAS delay is the heavy 
volume delays. They represent 13% of total delays. These delays are related to the congestion 
problems and are likely to increase with increases in traffic. Already, airplanes can be held on 
the ground because there is no airspace available to fly to their destination. On the Figure 2.5, 
we can see that an en-route severe weather reroute some traffic over Atlanta so that some of 
the airplane in Atlanta are held on the ground because they have to space to insert themselves 
in the air traffic toward the North East Cost. 
Figure 2.5: The causes of the disrupted flights (June 2003-June 2005) 
Source : [15] The MITRE Corporation, Anatomy of Air Travel Delays - The Scenarios 
2.3. Evolutions of delays 
Looking at the delay in a static way and taking the mean of the delay gives an idea of its 
importance, however it doesn't capture well all characteristics. Indeed, delays are not 
normally distributed (the median and the mean are very different because the mean is 
influenced by all the delay outliers). Moreover, delays evolve with time and have different 
shapes from a yearly, seasonal or daily perspective. 
2.3.1. Industry trend 
2.3.1.1. Yearly evolution of on-time performance 
Evolution of departure and arrival delays 
during the 1st semester of the year 
Figure 2.6: Departure and arrival delays for the first semester of the year (1998-2005) 
Figure 2.6 shows that arrival delays are on average 3.6 percent higher than departure delays. 
A part of this difference comes from the fact that flexibility at the airport can absorb a part of 
the delays (flexibility takes the form of scheduled slack time, aircraft swapping, crew 
swapping, etc.). Another part of this difference is that some of the flights that depart on-time 
from the gate will be held on the ground because of taxi-out or NAS delays, and this will have 
a consequence on the on-time anival performance if not enough time was scheduled for the 
flight. 
2.3.1.2. Taxi-out time 
Figure 2.7: Taxi-out time for US domestic flights 
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Taxi-out is the time between the departure of an aircraft from the gate and its take-off time. 
It's a better indicator than the on-time performance of the real congestion of the airport 
because the on-time performance can be improved by an increase in the block time, whereas 
the taxi-out time can't be increased so easily. 
We see that the taxi-out time went up until 2000, when it decreased with the decrease in 
traffic. Since then, it has been growing again so that in 2004, even though the percentage of 
delayed flight is lower than in 2000 due to block time adjustments (discussed in chapter 4), 
the average taxi-out time, and as a consequence, real congestion at the US airports is greater 
than in 2000. 
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2.3.2. Seasonal variations 
When planning, it is important to take into account seasonal variations of delays. Figure 2.8 
and Figure 2.9 show that delays and cancellations are much more prevalent in June, 
December and January. Weather and heavy summer traffic are the main causes of these 
increases in delays. 
In the summer period, there is a 3-4% increase in the number of scheduled flights compared 
to the rest of the year. 
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Figure 2.8: Seasonal arrival delays variations 
We also notice a small increase from one year to another in the percentage of cancelled 
flights, shown in Figure 2.8, which impact delays by reducing the amount of propagated 
delay. 
From 2002 to 2005, the percentage of cancelled flights increased from 1.3 1 % to 1.90%. 
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Figure 2.9: Seasonal cancellation variation 
2.3.3.  Variations during the day 
Figure 2.10 shows the evolution throughout the day of flight delays, by category. Propagated 
delays grow trough the day and become the major contributor to average delay after 5pm. 
Earlier in the day, NAS delays are the major contributor, except at the very beginning of the 
day, when carrier delays are the ,major contributor. 
This amplification of propagated delay is mainly due to the fact that the airlines don't have 
enough slack in their schedule to absorb the delay generated. In fact, these delays are often 
propagated by the airlines' schedules, with tight connections for crews and short turn times 
for aircraft. We will show in a later chapter the delay propagation resulting from crews 
connecting between different aircraft, and we will present ideas for reducing these 
connections with limited costs. 
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Figure 2.10: Summary of the evolution throughout the day of flight delays, by category 
2.4. Delays at Major Airports 
Among the 286 US airports that serve more than 10,000 passengers per year, 10% of them 
serve 65% of the air traffic. Many of 33 major airports (listed by BTS [4]) are used as a hub 
for one or more airlines. Therefore, traffic conditions at these airports impact significantly on 
the rest of the system. 
2. 4.1.  On-time performance 
Evolution of the on-time arrival performance 
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Figure 2.11: Comparison of the on-time performance (June 2003-May 2005) 
On-time arrival performance of major airports and secondary airports (Figure 2.1 1) are very 
close: 78.8% for the major airports and 79.5% for the secondary airports over the 2 year 
period investigated. This is due to the fact that operations at the other airports depend 
substantially on the operations at major airports. Secondary airports have many flight legs to 
major airports, and those to secondary airports are often delayed by late aniving aircraft or 
crews, or other propagated delays from the major airports. 
2. 4 .2 .  Taxi-time 
We do not conclude, however, that major and secondary airports operate the same. By 
loolung at taxi time, we can better identify the differences in congestion levels at these 2 types 
of airports. The taxi-time is 6 minutes longer on average at the 33 major airports (see Figure 
2.12). 
Differences in Taxi time for the Major Airports and 
the Others 
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Figure 2.12: Difference in taxi times 
Taxi-in time is also, on average, 2 minutes higher for major airports. This observation might 
be linked to the fact that the distances between the runway system and the terminal gates are 
higher in the case of the major airport. 
2.4.3. NAS delays 
Another difference in delays at major and secondary airports is NAS delays. Indeed, 80% of 
the total NAS delay in 2004 occurred at major airports, whereas they represented only 65% of 
the total aircraft movements. For major airports, NAS delays cause, on average, 2% more of 
the delays than at secondary airports, as shown in Figure 2.13. 
If weather is the same on average at major airports as secondary airports, this difference can 
be explained by the heavier traffic volumes at major airports. 
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Figure 2.13: Difference of NAS delays between Major Airport and the others 
2. 5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we identify the causes of delays and study their static and dynamic 
importance. Most of the causes of delay are independent of the airline, with weather 
accounting for 43% of total delay minutes. Where relevant, we point out opportunities for 
airlines to decrease delay propagation through scheduling and different operating procedures. 
In this chapter, we identify the diverse set of parameters that airline schedulers should take 
into consideration, including industry trends, seasonal variations, time of the day variations, 
taxi-out times, and airport type. 
In the next chapter, we describe one airline's attempt to mitigate delays through major 
schedule changes, especially at its hub airports. We study the operating benefits accrued and 
the impacts on delays. 

Chapter 3 
Delta Airline's De-banking of 
Atlanta Hartsfield Airport 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1. Banking and de-banking the major hubs 
According to Bogusch [4], after deregulation in 1978, established camers decided to compete 
not on fare but primarily on service (more itineraries and more frequency). The establishment 
of hub-and-spoke networks enabled the airlines to serve small communities, and to offer more 
frequency and more destinations. At these hubs, Bogusch explains that the priority was then 
to create short connections for passengers to minimize their total travel time and make the 
itinerary more likely to be selected by the travel agency booking system. Therefore, the 
airlines scheduled a bank of flights arriving in a short period of time followed by a bank of 
departing flights about 30-45 minutes later to enable the passengers to change airplanes. 
These were called "banked" hubs. 
However, Bogusch believes that the recent changes in the airline industry (including Internet 
booking that gives better price information to the customers, competition from low cost 
carriers, etc.) and the costs of the banked structured raises some questions about the viability 
of banked operations, which create delays at the airport and are expensive to operate. 
Continental was the first airline, with Newark in 1999, to de-peak one of its hubs. Continental 
spokesman David Messing claims that "it has been the real key to the improvements ... seen 
at Newark." 
In April 2002, American Airlines de-bank its hub in Chicago, O'Hare International Airport 
(ORD). It decided to spread the flights throughout the day. Bogusch shows that without losing 
market share, the operation was neutral or favorable from an operations perspective and likely 
favorable from a cost perspective. 
The same year, American Airlines de-banked its other hub in Dallas-Fort Worth. Agbokou [I]  
argues that the benefits brought by this transformation include increased aircraft utilization; 
decreased operating costs, less congestion at the airport, on the taxi-ways, on the runways and 
at the gates. All of these effects occur without much increase in the average passenger 
connection time. 
Our study will analyze the benefits of de-banlung Delta Airline's hub in Atlanta, measuring 
effects on operations, on-time performance, and congestion levels at the airport. To conclude, 
we compare the level of progress of Delta after de-banking with that of American Airlines 
after de-banking. 
3.1.2. Characteristics of the Atlanta Airport 
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport is the world's busiest passenger airport 
(83,606,583 passengers in 2004) with 964,858 aircraft operations. Figure 3.1 shows the recent 
trend in the yearly passengers' traffic in Atlanta. The number of passengers is increasing 
again after a drop in 2001. This year has experienced a 5.35% increase so far in the number of 
passengers compared to last year. Figure 3.2 shows the dominance of Delta at the airport 
compared to the rest of the carriers. Atlanta is Delta's main connecting hub, serving numerous 
destinations around the globe. Because of Delta's dominance of the Atlanta airport, we'll 
show that on-time performance of the airport is correlated with the on-time performance of 
Delta. 
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Figure 3.1: Traffic in terms of number of pax Figure 3.2 Repartition of the pax 
3.1.3.: Airport runway capacity 
Atlanta has a runway capacity of 180-188 movement per hours in optimum weather and 158- 
162 in IFR conditions, according to the Airport Capacity Benchmark [2]. Some more capacity 
will soon be added with the addition of a new independent runway in 2006. The airport 
capacity will increase to 237 movements per hours in optimum weather and 202 in IFR 
conditions. 
Overview of schedule changes 
3 .2 .1 .  Characteristics of schedule changes 
On January 31 2005, Delta implemented Operation Clockwork, the "single largest schedule 
transformation in aviation history" according to Gerald Grinstein, Delta's CEO. Indeed, the 
airline restructured 51% of its network. A major point of this transformation was to redesign 
the hub in Atlanta: de-peaking the schedule and spreading flights over the day time while 
adding more flights to surpass every other airline in history in the number of flights operated 
from any one city. 
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 enable us the compare the schedule change of Delta mainline flights at 
Atlanta at the end of January 2005. In the former schedule, there are 12 peaks of arrivals 
followed by 12 peaks of departures, each separated by about 45 minutes. 
For the February schedule, Delta spread flights throughout the day so that there is no 15- 
minute interval between 6:30 am and l lpm when there is not at least one departure and 
arrival scheduled. The number of periods with more than 15 departures scheduled per 15 
minute interval is decreased from 14 to 3 in the new schedule. 
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Figure 3.3: Aircraft movements of Delta mainline in January 2005 at Atlanta 
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Figure 3.4: Aircraft movements of Delta mainline in February 2005 at Atlanta 
What is remarkable is that at the same time, Delta added 63 new flights to the schedule, 
enabled by their increase in aircraft utilization and their de-hubbing of operations at Dallas. 
The result is an increase of 10% in mainline departures from Atlanta (Table 3.1), without an 
increase in fleet size. 
ATL Schedule Total Number of Mainline Delta Seats per 
Flights Nonstop Flights Connection Departure 
Destinations Flights (DL &DCI) 
Jan. 2005 970 186 625 345 126 
Feb. 2005 1,051 193 688 363 126 
Table 3.1: Overview of the flights change in ATL 
Source: Delta news 
3.2.2. Comparison with other Delta hubs 
The same day that they de-peaked the Atlanta hub, Delta stopped using its Dallas hub, 
decreasing the number of daily departures from Dallas from 258 to 21. In Cincinnati and Salt 
Lake City, Delta preserved its peaked schedule (Figures 3.5 and 3.6) 
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Figure 3.5: Delta mainline aircraft movements in February 2005 at Cincinnati 
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Figure 3.6: Delta mainline aircraft movements in February 2005 at Salt Lake City 
We define the peaking degree of a departure schedule as the average number of departures 
scheduled per 15 minute interval divided by the standard deviation of the group. (Peaking 
degree =Average/ StDev). 
These results show that the peaked scheduled in Atlanta during January had a smaller peaking 
degree than the other 2 hubs. This is mainly due to the fact that Atlanta had 12 peaks between 
6:30 am and 1 lpm that were very tightly scheduled, sometimes without breaks between them. 
Hence, the schedules at Cincinnati and Salt Lake City are more peaked than in Atlanta during 
January due to the gaps between groups of departing flights in Cincinnati and Salt Lake City. 
I 
ATL Jan 2005 ATL Feb 2005 CVG SLC 
Average number of departures 
per 15 minute intervals 9.25 9.95 2.41 1.76 
St Dev 5.82 2.72 3.57 2.63 
Peaking degree 0.63 0.27 1.48 1.49 
Table 3.2: Degree of peaking of Delta's hub airports 
3.3 Analysis of the effects of de-peaking on airport delays 
3.3.1. Methodology 
When analyzing the effect of a schedule modification, we must be aware that other factors can 
also influence the performance indicators that we compare. In her analysis, Agbokou [l] 
defines 4 factors that can disturb the performance analysis: seasonality of traffic, industry 
trends, one-time shocks and incremental changes (block time adjustments, boarding 
procedures, etc.). 
In our analysis, we compare the operations during the spring of 2004 (March to May) with the 
spring of 2005 (same months) in order to normalize the effects of weather on operations. (We 
assume that the spring weather in Atlanta was similar in 2004 and 2005). 
We will use the U.S. mean, our industry trend indicator, enables us to compare the evolution 
of performances of overall airline traffic with the evolution of performances at Atlanta with 
the de-banking of Delta. 
Because air traffic is somewhat reduced during weekends (see Figure 3.7) and airlines 
perform slightly different schedules on these days, we limit our analysis to the weekdays 
(Monday through Friday). 
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Figure 3.7: Number of departures per day 
3.3.2.  On-time departures 
We start by looking at on-time departures. On-time departures are influenced by many 
external factors, such as weather and congestion. However, it is a good indicator to assess the 
quality of an airline's operations because it represents an airline's ability to get aircraft, crew, 
aircraft service and passengers aboard on-time. At first glance, the benefits of the schedule 
change appear a bit disappointing. Indeed, the on-time departure percentage of Delta 
decreased from 84.7% in spring 2004 to 82.5% in spring 2005. However, we notice that the 
on-time departure percentage of the other airlines operating in Atlanta was reduced 5.9% from 
81.4% to 75.6%. (Table 3.3). 
2004 2005 Variation 
Delta 84,7% 82,5 % -2,1% 
Others 8 1,4% 75,6% -59% 
Table 3.3: Variation of on-time departure percentages 
The decrease in the on-time departure percentage is mainly due to the month of March 2005, 
during which less than 72% of the flights departed on-time. During that month, Atlanta 
experienced a lot of bad weather, establishing, in particular, a new daily record of 2.87 inches 
of rainfall on March 27th. 
The relatively good performance of Delta can be attributed to its schedule changes. We will 
study in further detail at which stage of the process the most benefits occur. We note 
immediately that from Spring 2004 and Spring 2005, the proportion of delay minutes due to 
"late arrival of aircraft" increased from 27.1% to 39.7%. We conclude that with higher 
aircraft utilization and shorter turn times, the schedule became less robust and more delay 
propagation occurred. 
3.3.3.  Taxi-out at Atlanta 
Taxi-out is the time between the departure of an aircraft from the gate and its take-off time. 
For a single flight, it depends on the distance from the gate to the runway, the runway 
configuration, the rate of arrivals and of course, the congestion levels at the airport. By 
considering Spring 2004 and Spring 2005 aggregated data, we assume that the different 
runway configurations and the weather are the same on average, so that the difference of taxi- 
time is related to a difference in the queuing time of the aircraft before take-off. 
A decrease in taxi-out time appears to be one of the major contributions of de-banking. 
Indeed, between 2004 and 2005, we have a decrease of 20% in the taxi-out time for Delta 
(Table 3.4), translating to 106,155 minutes of savings compared to the same period in the 
prev~ous year. 
In spring 2004, Delta had average taxi-out times greater by 2.5 minutes than the other airlines, 
primarily because Delta's banked operations resulted in flights queuing one behind another 
before departing. For this reason, the benefits of the new schedule and the spreading of the 
flights were disproportionately reaped by Delta. 
During Spring 2005, average taxi-out times for the airlines are close to one another because 
when there is no special pattern (no banking of one airline), flights go through the system at a 
"random" time and, on average, they experience the same delay. In this case, the average taxi 
time at the airport is a good estimation of the taxi-time for any specific airline. 
Table 3.4 Average Taxi-out Times (in minutes) 
Delta 
Others 
Spring 2004 
22.8 
20.: 
Spring 2005 
18.3 
18.0 
Variation 
-1 9.9% 
-1 1.3% 
--t Spring 2004 
Evolution of the Taxi-out time at ATL 
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Time of Departure from the Gate 
Figure 3.8: Taxi-out time as a function of departure from the Gate 
Figure 3.8 shows the change in the taxi-out time at Atlanta for all airlines throughout the day. 
Note that the peaks during Spring 2004 we easily identifiable, but they are shaved in the new 
schedule, avoiding many of the delays. 
This plot allows us to visualize the reduction in delay achieved with the new schedule as 
delay produced during the day is represented by the area under the curve. 
The schedule changes allowed Delta planners to reduce the variation of taxi-out time, an 
important contributor to arrival delay. Interestingly, Delta's schedule changes also benefit its 
competitors by reducing their taxi-out times. 
3. 3. 4. Importance of meeting airport capacity 
When designing a de-banked schedule, we argue that an airline should constrain its schedules 
to adhere to expected airport capacity. 
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Figure 3.9 Schedule before Figure 3.10: Operated at gate before 
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 depict the planned and actual gate departure schedules, respectively for 
January 2005. In the actual schedule, peaks are decreased a bit compared to the plan, with 
flights spread out more evenly. In Figure 3.11 we present the average number of departures 
from the Atlanta airport throughout the month of January. Note that compared to gate 
departures, take-off times further reduce the peaks and spread out the departures of aircraft. 
In Figure 3.12, we display Delta's February 2005 schedule. Note the similarities between it 
and Figure 3.12. We conjecture that Delta designed its new schedule, recognizing the 
constraints of airport capacity, and adding new flights at times when excess capacity existed. 
BEFORE AFTER 
Figure 3.11 Take-off time before Figure 3.12: Schedule after 
3. 3. 5. On-time arrivals at ATL 
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Figure 3.13 On-time arrivals in Atlanta 
Figure 3.13 shows the improvement in the on-time arrival rate at Atlanta for Delta. Improved 
schedule reliability in Atlanta leads to improved downstream operations, and overall 
reductions in delays. The term "Delta Connections" corresponds to the regional partners of 
Delta operating in Atlanta (Atlantic Southeast Airlines and Comair). Interestingly, while 
Delta's mainline operations became more reliable in Atlanta, the arrival on-time performance 
of Airtran, Delta Connections and the Atlanta airport in general, worsened. This perhaps can 
be explained by the fact that arrival performance depends heavily on operations at the 
departing airports. 
The US mean shows that the percentage of on-time arrivals increased for the whole system. 
3.4 Comparison with other de-banking experiments 
3. 4.1. Comparison 
We report in the table below the key performance indicators calculated by Bogusch and 
Agbokou to measure the benefits of the de-banking of American Airlines operations in 
O'Hare and Dallas. 
Table 3.5: Comparison of performance indicators 
Table 3.5 shows that de-banking has been successful and has improved the operations of each 
participating airline. The main benefit for the de-banking airline is the decrease in taxi-out 
times, helping to stem down-stream delay propagation 
3.4.2. Who is next? 
Given the positive results of de-banking, we ask if this trend will continue or not. 
In June 2005, United Airlines implemented a de-peaking effort at LAX with the aim of 
achieving better utilization of aircraft, staff, and infrastructure. According to Yu [ 171, the 
results of the de-banking for an airline are considerable cost savings for the airline and a small 
increase in transfer times for passengers. 
1 Hub I Aircraft movements I 
Chicago I (ORD) 1 UA, AA (de-banked) ( 992,427 I 
Atlanta I (ATL) I Delta (de-banked) 1 964,858 I 
Los Angeles I (LAX) I UA (de-banked) 1 655,097 I 
Denver I (DEN) IUA 1 560,198 I 
Phoenix (PHX) AmericaWest 546,763 
Las Vegas (LAS) Southwest 544,679 
Minneapolis I (MSP) 1 Norhtwest 1 54 1,093 I 
Detroit 1 (DTW) I Norhtwest 1522,538 I 
Cincinnati I (CVG) 1 Delta 1 517,520 I 
Table 3.6: Airport ranking by number of operations 
Currently, the 5 top US airports in terms of aircraft movements have been successfully de- 
banked by the airlines using them as a hub. Because United is reported by the Airport 
operation fact sheet [16] to have made an effort to de-peak its schedule, we consider it as de- 
banked. 
3.5. Conclusion 
De-banking benefited Delta operationally in that it allowed the company to decrease its taxi- 
out delays by 20% and increase its on-time performance for departing and arrival flights. 
However, what is striking in this study is that the dominant carrier is in a position of weakness 
at its own hub. Indeed, the established airline cannot operate its banked schedule as planned . 
When taxi-time delays in particular increase to a certain level, the dominant carrier is driven 
to adopt this strategy because delays in banked operations affect its flights more than it affects 
those of its competitors. 
Figure 3.14 shows that Airtran maintains a banked schedule at peak hours. This suggests that 
it is their strategy to provide shorter connections than on-time reliability of its flights. 
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Figure 3.14 Airtran schedule at Atlanta 

Chapter 4 
Addition of buffer time 
4.1 Introduction 
The elapsed time from schedule flight departure time to flight arrival time represents the 
planned block time, including flying time between the flight's origin and destination, taxi-out 
time at the flight's origin, taxi-in time at the flight's destination, and expected delays due to 
congestion and other disruptive effects. In fact, we found that the actual flying time represents 
on average only 62% of the total scheduled block time for the flights departing Atlanta in 
February 2005. Actual flying time as a percent of planned block time measures between 50% 
for flights covering short distances and 97% for flights covering the longest distances. 
In this chapter, we analyze and compare airlines' buffering strategies, that is, their approach 
to estimating block times given information about flying times, taxi times, congestion levels 
and their desired on-time performance. 
4.2 Block Time Comparisons 
4.2.1. Example of Atlanta-Dallas 
With 30 departures per day, Dallas Forth Worth is the most served destination from Atlanta. 
Delta schedules 13 departures per day, American Airline 1 1  and Airtran 6. 
The average flight time to Dallas, 732 miles away from Atlanta, is 117 minutes. However, 
because of taxi times and delays, the average gate to gate time is 145.4 min. Figure 4.1 is a 
plot of the density function of the gate-to-gate time of the flights from Atlanta to Dallas, 
obtained with S-plus. We find that 10% of the flights need more than 160 minutes to complete 
the trip. We will compare the performance of the 3 carriers to this destination during the 
month of February 2005. 
4. 2. 2. Analysis 
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Figure 4.1: Density function of actual time gate to gate (ATL-DFW) in February 2005 
In Figure 4.2, we compare the block times announced by the 3 airlines for times throughout 
the day. First of all, we can see that the airlines don't propose the same block time through out 
the day. Indeed, they anticipate taxi delays at rush hour in the morning and the end of the 
afternoon. The second reason is that they use different types of aircraft with different cruise 
speed to cover the flight. 
165 
Figure 4.2: Block Time of the flights departing from Atlanta to Dallas 
Figure 4.3: Time gate to gate (bold) versus scheduled time 
In Figure 4.3, we compare their planned schedule with the realized gate-to-gate times. We can 
see that Delta has the shortest gate-to-gate times (on average, nearly 6 minutes shorter than 
American and 4 minutes shorter than Airtran). The obvious explanation is that Delta uses 
faster airplanes than the others. This is partially true. Indeed Delta has the shortest flying time 
and this alone explains the time difference with Airtran, but not with American Airline. The 
taxi- out time in Atlanta is on average the same for all departing flights. 
Interestingly, the difference in gate-to-gate time between American and the others stems from 
the fact that American's average taxi-in time is 57% higher than Delta's and 37.5% higher 
than Airtran flights, as shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Mean value in minutes for ATL-DFW flights in February 2005 
AA 
Delta 
Airtran 
The reason is not that the terminal of American is further from the runways than the terminals 
of the others. To understand the difference, consider the histogram in Figures 4.4 - 4.6 
showing the density line of the taxi-in times for the 3 airlines. 
Taxi out 
19.2 
19.5 
19.5 
Flight time 
1 17.9 
1 16.2 
1 19.0 
Taxi in 
11.0 
7.0 
8.0 
Gate to Gate 
148.1 
142.7 
146.5 
Figure 4.4: Taxi-in time of American Airline Flights ATL-DFW in February 2005 
Figure 4.5: Taxi-in time of Delta Flights ATL-DFW in February 2005 
Figure 4.6: Taxi-in time of Airtran Flights ATL-DFW in February 2005 
The histograms with density line demonstrate that the taxi-in delays don't come from the fact 
that the terminal of American is further to reach than the terminal of Delta or Airtran. Indeed, 
all airlines have nearly the same median time of 6-7 minutes. 
However, in the case of American Airline we see that 10% of the flights were experiencing 
long delays greater than 20 minutes after landing and before reaching their gate. The main 
explanation for this is that the gate was occupied and unable to receive the incoming aircraft. 
Consider the on-time performance results shown on Figure 4.7 and table 4.2 These results are 
quite poor even though the airline estimates of the gate-to-gate times needed are quite close to 
the realized times. 
Figure 4.7: On-time arrival in Dallas performance 
Table 4.2 shows that American Airlines achieves the highest on-time arrival rate with its 
strategy of longer block-times. Delta is second, due to its short gate-to-gate times. 
1 1 On-time 1 Delaved 1 Cancelled 1 Diverted I 
Table 4.2: Carrier performances at Dallas 
AA 
Delta 
Airtran 
81,3% 
76,4% 
57,8% 
16,0% 
22,2% 
41,7% 
2,8% 
1,4% 
O,O% 
O,O% 
O,O% 
0,5% 
The major contributors to on-time performance degradation are late departures of aircraft 
from the gates at Atlanta. These late departures are mainly attributable to propagated delays, 
as shown in Table 4.3. 
Average Departure - Main causes of the delays 
Delay (in minutes) Carrier delay NAS delay Late aircraft 
AA 9.7 27.7% 14.8% 56.8% 
Delta 9.7 24.8% 21 .O% 54.0% 
Airtran 15.9 25.6% 24,0% 50.1 O/O 
Table 4.3: Causes of Delays at Dallas 
4.2.3.  Calculation of the gate-to-gate time 
By knowing the distribution of the flight time needed (Figure 4.8), and the average taxi-out 
time at the scheduled departure time (Figure 4.9), we can better estimate the gate-to-gate 
times that should be planned. In the case of American Airlines, taxi-in times can not be 
considered constant due to their gate availability problems. 
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Figure 4.8: Airtime needed between ATL and DFW 
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Figure 4.9: Taxi-out time in February for all the flights departing from Atlanta 
4.3 Practices of timetable modification 
4.3.1. Introduction 
To achieve schedule reliability, airlines add time to their flying times and thereby increase 
their block-time estimates. This is a reasonable approach, given current levels of delays in 
taxi-time and flight time. In addition, some airlines add buffer time to their estimations of 
block-time, that is, they add additional time beyond the necessary estimated gate-to-gate time 
in order to gain robustness during operations. We compare airline practices concerning the 
use of buffer time in their planned schedules. We focus our analysis on a specific airport, 
namely Boston Logan Airport, which is not a hub of a major airline. We gather data of all 
departures and arrivals at Logan during January 2005. To estimate buffer times introduced by 
airlines, we select one airline at random, specifically, JetBlue, to determine among different 
types of regression, which one best fits this kind of data. Then, we utilize the selected 
regression approach to analyze the buffer time practices of other airlines and we compare it 
with their on-time performances. 
4.3. 2. Linear regression (base case: Least Square Fit) 
The data we use contains all the departure and arrival delays for the flights operated by 
jetBlue at Boston during January 2005. We begin by test how well a linear regression works 
with the data. Then we give an interpretation of its intercept. 
Fitted : DEP.DELAY 
Figure 4.10 Linear regressions between arrivals and departures delays 
Figure 4.10 shows the linear regression of the arrival delays in minutes versus the departure 
delays of the jetBlue flights that ended or began in Boston.. The formula used is 
ARR.DELAY=a*DEP.DELAY +P. 
The linear regression fits the data fairly well, with an R-Squared of 0.9074. The coefficients 
of the regression in Table 4.1 are useful in understanding buffer times. 
I 1 Value I Std. Error I I Intercept (P) 1-4-9892 10.71129 1 
Table 4.1: Coefficients for the linear regression of jetslue data 
The absolute value of the intercept in Table 4.1 indicates the average number of minutes that 
a flight departing on time will arrive early at its destination. We refer to it as the actual buffer 
time. Because the slope of the regression is very near to one, it  means that on average a 
flight's gate to gate time is nearly 5 minutes faster than the scheduled block time. 
With this average of nearly 5 minutes of slack time incorporated in its schedule, jetBlue 
appears to be making efforts to guarantee schedule robustness. For this low cost airline with 
remarkably high aircraft utilization, schedule robustness is critical to achieving planned 
productivity levels. 
The residuals (Figure 4.1 1) can give us an indication of the goodness of fit of the regression. 
Fitted : DEP.DELAY 
Figure 4.11 Residuals of the linear regression between arrival and departures delays 
Figure 4.1 1 represents the residuals obtained for the linear regression of arrival delays versus 
departure delays for jetBlue flights. We can identify 3 outliers with small departure delays 
and large arrival delays. These are all flights destined to Boston Logan Airport that were 
delayed by the National Aviation System on the 24" of January. The disruptions were caused 
by a period of very bad weather over Boston and congestion at the airport resulting from 
Logan's closure for some hours during the previous day due to a blizzard. 
4.3 .3 .  Robust regressions (by erasing the outliers) 
Because we don't want the outliers to have a greater influence on the results than the majority 
of the data, we eliminate the outliers from the jetBlue arrival and departure delays data. Then 
we draw the linear regression ARR.DELAY=a*DEP.DELAY +P for the rest of the data and 
we collect the Intercept and the Slope. Table 4.2 summarizes our findings. 
Table 4.2: Comparison of the Robust Regressions 
Intercept 
Slope 
The results for various numbers of outliers removed are quite similar. As more outliers are 
removed, the slope tends to decrease to 1. To quantify the correspondence of our mean results 
with the data, we define the quality of the pick around the mean value as Q = MeanIStdev. 
For the intercept, we find Q= 17.3 and for the slope Q=42.3. Both values are much greater 
than 10 and as a consequence, we can conclude that the means are good estimators for both 
the intercept and slope. 
4.3.4.  Least Trimmed Squares Robust Regression (LTS Regression) 
Linear 
regression 
-4.9895 
1.0638 
Removing outliers is not easy to implement because the definition of outliers is not always 
very clear. Moreover, we would like to find a systematic method that enables us to 
characterize the properties of the data. We again use the data set of jetBlue flights and we 
study the results of another type of regression. The least trimmed squares regression approach 
minimizes the sum of the smallest "half' of the squared residuals. The regression has a high 
breakdown point (nearly 50%): by definition, it means that if nearly 50% of the data is 
corrupted, the regression will not be influenced by all the outliers and will still reveal the 
minus 3 
outliers 
-4.4073 
1.0188 
minus 7 
outliers 
-4.48 12 
1.0244 
minus 10 
outliers 
-4.7737 
1.0079 
Mean 
-4.6629 
1.0287 
Standard deviation 
of Mean 
0.2691 
0.0243 
main trend of the data set. Its usual rate of convergence is higher than the least median of 
squares regression [lo]. The objective of the least trimmed squares approach is to minimize 
the sum of the q smallest squared residuals. To determine q, the residuals are ordered in 
increasing value and q is set to be slightly larger than ?h of n, where n is the number of 
observations. q is thus set equal to floor(n12) + floor((p + 1)/2), where p is the rank of x. The 
objective then is: 
rnin C I - xib 1' 
In this case, p=2 estimated parameters for the regression. 
Using again the linear formula ARR.DELAY = a * DEP.DELAY + B, and the same data set 
as in the previous analysis, the robust approach gives us an absolute value for the intercept of 
7.4 and a linear coefficient very close to 1, as presented in Table 4.3 
Table 4.3: Coefficien for the LTS regression of jetBlue data 
I I 1 I I 
0 200 400 600 800 
F~tted. ARR DELAY 
Figure 4.12 Standardized LTS Residuals versus Fit 
S-plus indicates that this estimation considers 896 data points, representing 90% of the data. 
We find an intercept of -7.4 based on. 90% of the flights departing on-time, implying they 
arrived 7.4 minutes ahead of schedule on average. Thus, for 90% of the data, the buffer time 
added to the expected gate-to-gate time was 7.4 minutes on average. 
However, as illustrated in Figure 4.12, there are too many standardized residuals greater than 
2.5. This indicates that this kind of regression doesn't take into account a particular pattern 
and therefore doesn't capture the structure of the data. Therefore, we will try to apply another 
robust regression to estimate better the average amount of buffer time airlines add to their 
gate-to-gate time. 
4.3.5. Robust MM Linear Regression 
The Least squares method carries the assumption that observations are normally distributed. 
This is not the case in our dataset. Hence, the LTS regression returns inaccurate estimates. 
Therefore, because the dataset contains significant outliers, it is more accurate to use the 
Robust MM regression, a nonparametric technique that is very useful for fitting linear 
relationships. The Robust MM regression is also less sensitive to erratic observations than the 
nonparametric approach. [ 141. 
In Robust MM Regression, robust initial regression coefficients are used as starting values. 
The robust regression coefficients are found by minimizing a scale parameter, S. x is a 
bounded function chosen so that it will decrease the influence of outliers. Here, we use 
6 
~ ( u )  = u - 3u4 + 3u2 for I u I  5 1 ~ ( u )  = 1 . x is an integral of ~ ( u )  in the formula : 
c, = 1.548 (Tuning constant), ,8 = 0.5 
The M-estimate is derived according to the loss function from the S estimate and the fixed 
scale estimate produced. With S-PLUS, the procedure is generated with the ZmRobMM 
function. [lo] 
Using again the linear formula ARR-DELAY = a * DEP.DELAY + p, we get the following 
coefficients (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4: CoefEcients for the MM Robust regression of jetBlue data 
The absolute value of the intercept is 9.2 minutes. This result obtained by the robust method 
giving less weight to the outliers is considered as the buffer time planners added to the 
expected gate-to-gate time in order to gain robustness. We refer to this as the "planned buffer 
time ". 
Figure 4.13 shows that the regression fits the data points fairly well. 
Fitted : DEP.DELAY 
Figure 4.13 Robust MM regression 
The absolute value of the intercept obtained by the Robust MM regression is thus employed 
to quantify what we call the "planned buffer time", that is, the amount of time the airline 
added to the expected gate-to-gate time to guarantee more robustness during operations. The 
"actual buffer time" is estimated by the intercept of the linear regression. 
4 .3 .6 .  Comparison Robust MM Linear Regression versus LS fit 
The comparison of the intercept of these 2 regressions gives us some information about the 
plans and achievements of the airline. Our findings are presented in Table 4.5. The small 
standard deviations demonstrate the accuracy of the estimations. 
Table 4.5: Comparison of the coefficients of the regressions 
Given the property of these two regressions, we will estimate the "actual buffer time" with 
the intercept of the linear regression because it takes into account the entire data set. The 
"planned buffer time" is estimated with the intercept of the Robust MM regression because it 
is not influenced by outliers. 
Linear Regression 
MM Robust Regression 
4.4. Application to different airlines 
4.4.1. Method 
We apply the linear regression and the Robust MM regression to the departures and arrivals 
of different airlines operating in Boston for the month of January. We also report the arrival 
on-time performance of flights during this month. 
Intercept (a) 
4 .4 .2 .  Results 
Value 
-4.9892 
-9.2098 
DEP.DELAY (P) 
Std. En-or 
0.7 1 129 
0.82089 
Value 
1.0649 
0.9889 
Table 4.6: Buffer time (in minutes) practice for different airlines in January in Boston 
Std. Error 
0.01079 
0.01541 
On-time 
"actual buffer time" 
"planned buffer time" 
Continental 
67% 
4.7 
-0.77 
JetBlue 
67% 
-5 .O 
-9.2 
Comair 
62% 
-3.0 
-7.3 
Airtran 
63% 
3.5 
-1.4 
UA 
59% 
2.7 
-3 .O 
In Table 4.6, we report the intercepts of the regressions. An actual buffer time of -3.0 (for 
Comair) means that aircraft were experiencing gate-to-gate time that were on average 3 
minutes shorter than those scheduled. An actual buffer time of 2.7 (for United Airlines) 
implies that aircraft were arriving 2.7 minutes later than scheduled. From this result, we can 
see that jetBlue was the most conservative in planning its flight block time by adding 9.2 
minutes to the average gate-to-gate time. 
The on-time performance for this airport is very poor, for all the airlines, and it doesn't appear 
to be correlated with the quality of operations at the airport. Indeed, Continental achieved the 
same on-time percentage as jetBlue, but Continental was adding no buffer time to their 
expected gate-to-gate times, while jetBlue was adding significant buffer time. 
This non-correlation comes from the fact that on-time performance of one flight is also 
influenced by the preceding flights, which anive late or not. 
Another factor that we believe should influence the amount of buffer time airlines allocate to 
a flight leg is the distance flown by the aircraft. In Table 4.7, we show the mean distance of 
flights flown by each airline, and their planned buffer times. Clearly, different airlines have 
different strategies for allocating buffer times. 
Table 4.7: Mean distance 
Average Distance 
(miles) 
"planned buffer 
time" 
4.5. Conclusion 
Adding buffer time to account for congestion at airports and weather delays is necessary to 
achieve schedule reliability. Buffer time estimates should include the effects of seasonal 
variations. Some airlines, like United Airlines, Airtran and Continental, underestimated the 
need for buffer times at Boston Logan in January 2005, a period in which extreme weather 
severely disrupted operations at Logan. Buffer time estimates should also recognize that there 
Continental 
628 
-0.77 
JetBlue 
1541 
-9.2 
Airtran 
511 
-1.4 
Comair 
346 
-7.3 
UA 
1364 
-3 .O 
are periods of the day when taxi-times are higher, namely, when departure queues form. In 
the case of the American Airlines' flights from Atlanta to Dallas, not capturing gate delays 
has serious delay effects. All of these factors should be considered in estimating buffer times. 
Of course, there are some parameters that are specific to the particular day of operations and 
cannot be predicted by the planners. However, the task of the planners is to consider as many 
parameters as possible in order to decrease the risk and consequences of delay propagation 
while maintaining strict cost controls. This question will be discuss and evaluated in the last 
part of this thesis. 
Chapter 5 
Implementation of a robust crew 
scheduling model 
5.1 Introduction 
Our motivation for a different crew scheduling approach comes from the fact that analyzing 
delay data from a major U.S. airline, we find that 18 % of the non-system delays are related to 
crews (that is, waiting for a crew connection, insufficient turn time to complete a crew 
change, etc.). It suggests that improvements in how crew pairings are constructed can lead to 
decreased numbers of schedule disruptions and reduced delay propagation and amplification 
for subsequent flights. 
After having presented two approaches used by the airlines to make their schedules more 
reliable, this part of the thesis will address scheduling optimization solutions for crews. In 
particular, we will focus on optimization models targeting reductions in delay propagation, as 
we have seen that it is the major source of delays starting at 5pm. Our review of relevant 
optimization models will be followed by an implementation of our selected models using the 
Carmen Crew Pairing software [7].We evaluate the trade-off between schedule robustness and 
cost. 
5.2.  Review of crew pairing models 
The crew scheduling problem is the last sub-problem to be solved in the Airline Schedule 
Planning Process. After defining the flight schedule, assigning aircraft types to the flight legs 
in the schedule, and routing individual aircraft to routinely visit maintenance stations, the 
final task in the Airline Schedule Planning Process is to develop crew schedules that ensure 
every flight leg is covered by a crew and that total crew cost is minimized. To deal with 
uncertainty and delays, different robust approaches have been proposed during recent years 
with the objectives to decrease the occurrence of disruptions and ease the recovery process. 
Depending on the definition of robustness taken, different robustness criteria have been 
defined. Our focus is to reduce delay propagation and amplification caused by crews. 
5.2.1. Generic Crew Pairing Model 
We focus on the crew pairing problem, that is, the problem of finding the minimum cost set of 
crew schedules that cover all flight legs. In crew scheduling, the crew pairing problem is 
solved and then the selected problems are then assembled into monthly crew work schedules. 
The first crew pairing model we present is a "base" case that does not include any robustness 
criteria. Its objective is to find the set of pairings that cover all the flights and minimizes crew 
costs. Its solution provides a useful baseline from which we can measure the increased costs 
needed to achieve increases in robustness. 
The parameters and variables in this model are defined as followed: 
Parameters 
F is the set of flight legs i 
P is the set of pairings p 
c, is the cost of pairing p 
S, equals 1 if pairing p includes flight leg i, and 0 otherwise 
Variables 
y ,  equals 1 if pairing p is selected, and 0 otherwise 
Given the above notation, the formulation of the generic crew pairing problem (Barnhart et a1 
[3]) is: 
subject to 
The objective (1-1) minimizes the cost of the chosen set of pairings. The cover constraints ( 1 -  
2) and the binary constraints (1-3) ensure that each flight leg i is covered by exactly one 
pairing. 
5 .2 .2 .  Bi-criteria approach 
Ehrgott and Ryan [9] focus on developing a measure of non-robustness for each pairing based 
on the effect of potential delays within the pairing. If the crew stays with the aircraft between 
2 flights, there will be no penalty. However, if the crew has to change aircraft within a duty 
period, the penalty will reflect the potential disruption effect of the possible delay caused by 
the aircraft change. 
Given a pairing p consisting of f flights, they define for each flight i=I ... f-1, three different 
times related to crew connections (see Figure 5.1), namely: 
Ground duty time (GDT,'" ): the minimum connection time; usually 45 minutes or 
more if meal breaks are included. 
Measure of delay of incoming flight ( DM ): the mean delay plus its standard 
deviation for the incoming flight i 
Scheduled Ground time ( SGT.'" ): the time between two consecutive flights on 
different aircraft in the duty. 
Figure 5.1: Definitions of the different times in Ehrgott's and Ryan's model 
The penalty for each crew connection is defined as: 
P:+l = Max[0, GDT,"' + DM :" - SGT"' ] . 
The non-robustness criterion is then defined for each pairing p, composed of f flights, as: 
They use the non-robustness measure as a second objective. The parameters and variables in 
their model are defined as followed: 
Parameters 
F is the set of flight legs i 
P is the set of pairings p 
c ,  is the cost of pairing p 
r, is the penalty define above of pairing p 
6, equals 1 if pairing p includes flight leg i, and 0 otherwise 
Variables 
y p  equals 1 if pairing p is selected, and 0 otherwise 
Given the above notation, the formulation of the Ehrgott and Ryan's model is: 
subject to 
The objectives (2-1) and (2-2) minimize the cost and non-robustness, respectively of the 
chosen set of pairings. The cover constraints (2-3) and the binary constraints (2-4) ensure that 
each flight leg i is covered by exactly one pairing. 
To generate solutions, they use the &-constraint method (Chankong and Haimes, 1983) based 
on the idea of only minimizing one of the objectives and transforming the other one into a 
constraint limited by an upper bound. 
5.2.3. Maximizing Short Connect Utilization 
Our approach adopts a similar point of view. However, without using historical data, we 
guide our optimization approach to select solutions that will reduce delay propagation and 
amplification by making the crew follow the routing of the plane as much as possible. 
A short connect is defined as a connection which is feasible for a crew only if two sequential 
flights comprising that connection have been assigned to a common aircraft. 
Figure 5.2 illustrates how short connect utilization decreases the risk of delay propagation. 
. . performed by*.  
Red aircraft 
Bhe 
Figure 5.2: Illustration of maximizing short connection 
Suppose that the Red aircraft is assigned to cover Flights 1 and 2 and the Blue aircraft is 
assigned to cover Flights 3 and 4. Further suppose that Crew A is assigned to cover Flights 1 
and 4, Crew B is assigned to Flight 3 and Crew C is assigned to Flight 2 (see Figure 5.2). 
Crew A needs 45 minutes to connect to flight 4 and has 50 minutes scheduled connection 
time. Assume that the red aircraft makes a quick turn of 30 minutes following flight 1. In this 
case, the short connection of the red aircraft from flight 1 to 2 is not utilized, that is no crew is 
assigned to it. Instead, a crew is assigned to the critical connection (that is, a crew connection 
between two different aircraft with duration less than some critical threshold value) between 
the red aircraft operating flight 1 and the blue aircraft operating flight 4. 
Now consider that Flight 1 experiences 40 minutes of delay. Flight 2 will be delayed because 
its aircraft is delayed and Flight 4 is also cannot depart on-time because its crew is delayed. 
If, instead of assigning a crew to the critical connection between flights 1 and 4, a crew is 
assigned to the short connection between flights 1 and 2, delay propagation and amplification 
is reduced because only flight 2 is delayed, rather that both flights 2 and 4. 
Given a solution to the maintenance routing problem, we can improve upon the operational 
flexibility of a crew schedule by maximizing the number of short connections used. 
To formulate this problem, we introduce the following parameters and variables: 
Parameters 
F is the set of flight legs i 
* P is the set of pairings p 
* SC is the set of short connects provided by the maintenance routing solution 
c, is the operating cost of pairing p 
bjp is equals 1 if pairing p includes short connect i, and 0 otherwise 
6, equals 1 if pairing p includes flight leg i, and 0 otherwise 
Variables 
y, equals 1 if pairingp is selected, and 0 otherwise. 
Given this notation, we formulate the crew pairing problem that maximizes the number of 
short connections used as: 
subject to 
The objective (3-1) of this crew pairing model is to maximize the number of short 
connections used by the crew schedule. The cover constraints (3-2) and the binary constraints 
(3-3) ensure that each flight leg i is covered by exactly one pairing. Constraint (3-4) 
guarantees that planned crew costs are within a certain tolerance level above the minimum 
possible crew costs given by the generic crew pairing model. 
The main limitation of our model is that the number of possible short connects is limited by 
the aircraft routing. Therefore it would be interesting to create an aircraft routing model where 
we would maximize the number of possible short connect before solving this robust crew 
pairing model. 
5.2.4. Integrated Robust Routing and Crew Model 
The "Integrated Robust Routing and Crew Pairing Model" presented by Agbokou [l] 
augments the basic crew pairing model with a set of feasible aircraft routings and then selects 
simultaneously the maintenance routing solution and crew pairing solution that provides a 
robust, yet near minimum-cost, crew solution. 
While our model favors short connect utilization (and as a consequence disfavors any crew 
connections), her model distinguishes between critical crew connections and others, stating 
that if the crew connection time is longer than 1 hour and 15 minutes, the crew is much less 
likely to be disturbed and can thus be included in the solution without penalty. 
Agbokou defines a critical crew connection (see Figure 5.3) defined as one in which a crew is 
required to change aircraft between successive flights, and the connection time is between 45 
minutes and 1 hour 15 minutes. 
45 rmn 1 :1S 
Figure 5.3: Definition of a critical connection 
As a consequence, Agbokou's model achieves the same benefits that we identify regarding 
decreases in delay amplification. Indeed, it pushes crew connections out of the critical zone, 
where possible, if flight delays are less than 30 minutes (the time of the critical connection 
zone). In 2004, actual delays and cancellations, by length of delay, are displayed in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Delays and cancellations for the US domestic flights in 2004 
Table 5.1 shows that 11.5% of the flights in 2004 were delayed by more than 30 minutes. 
These flights will continue to create disruptions to crews using the critical connection 
thresholds set by Agbokou. To achieve a more robustness solution, we would need to extend 
the critical connection window. 
? 
On-time 
78.08% 
The parameters and variables of the Agbokou model are: 
More than 30 
minutes 
1 1 .50°/o 
Delayed between 15 
and 30 minutes 
8.44% 
Cancelled 
1.79% 
Diverted 
0.1 9% 
Parameters 
F is the set of flight legs f 
P is the set of pairings p 
S is the set of maintenance solutions s. A maintenance solution s is a set of aircraft 
strings that satisfy the basic aircraft maintenance routing requirements. It determines 
the feasible short connects and the number of critical connects. 
R, is the set of route strings included in maintenance solution s 
? is the set of critical connections annulled by S 
= $ is the set of short connections allowed by S 
b,, equals 1 if route string r includes (that is, assigns the same aircraft to) critical 
connect c, and 0 otherwise 
Ph, equals 1 if route string r allows short connect h, and 0 otherwise 
6& equals 1 if pairing p includes flightf, and 0 otherwise 
a ,  equals 1 if pairing p includes critical connect c, and 0 otherwise 
ol,, equals 1 if pairingp includes short connect h, and 0 otherwise 
r is the "robustness" factor 
Variables 
x, equals 1 if maintenance solution s is in the solution and 0 otherwise. 
y, equals 1 if pairingp is picked, and 0 otherwise 
ac , PC equals (0,O) if critical connect c is covered by one crew and one aircraft or if 
critical connect c is not included in the maintenance routing solution and is not in the crew 
pairing solution; (0, 1) if critical connect c is not in the crew pairing solution included and 
is included in the maintenance routing solution; ( I ,  0) if critical connect c is included in 
the crew pairing solution and not in the maintenance routing solution. 
Given the above notation, here is the Agbokou formulation of the integrated robust aircraft 
routing and crew model: 
min CaC 
subject to 
C C f l h r x S  -C ahp y p  = O V short connections h E S" 
C b,xS - C a,  y ,  - fl, + = 0 t/ critical connections c E 2: (4-5) 
SES ER, PEP 
The objective (4-1) is to minimize the number of critical connects in the selected crew 
pairings. Constraint (4-2) ensures that exactly one maintenance solution is selected. 
Constraints (4-3) guarantee that each flight leg is covered by exactly one crew. Constraints 
(4-4) ensure that only feasible short connects are included in the crew pairing solution. 
Constraints (4-5) count the number of critical connects in the pairing solution that are not in 
the aircraft maintenance routing solution. Constraint (4-6) ensures that the cost of the 
selected crew pairings is close to minimum crew pairing cost. 
5.3 Implementation 
5.3.1 Introduction 
Our objective is to obtain a sense of the trade-off between schedule robustness and crew costs. 
Crew cost is the second largest expense of the airlines after fuel (Barnhart et a1 [3]), and 
hence, increases in robustness must be weighed carefully against the increases in crew costs 
necessary to achieve this added schedule reliability. We implement the model of Agbokou: 
"Integrated Robust Routing and Crew Model7' and our model. We run these models on the 
Crew Pairing optimization software of Carmen System. The advantage of using an industry 
product is that it can solve important scheduling problems; the drawback is that it limits us in 
the model formulation. 
5.3.1.1. Fleet used 
The fleet used in our analysis is the American Airlines Boeing 737 fleet. It comprises 77 
aircraft that can transport up to 142 passengers with an average stage length of 1108 miles. In 
2004, their average number of block hours per day was 9 hours and the aircraft performed an 
average of 3.2 departures per day with a load factor of 7 1.3 %. (source: Aviation Daily) 
The Boeing 737 is the second smallest airplane in the fleet of American Airlines (see Figure 
5.4). It transports more passengers (142 passengers compared to 129 passengers) and travels 
a longer distance on average (1010 miles on average compared to 891 miles on average) than 
the M80. This aircraft is appropriate for our analysis because average of 3.2 aircraft 
departures per day provides opportunities for crews to operate different aircraft. Therefore, 
this relatively small problem is useful for testing our ideas for adding robustness to crew 
schedules. 
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Figure 5.4: Composition of the American Airline fleet 
5.3.1.2. Destinations 
Figure 5.5 was generated with the "geoplot" function of RAVE. It shows graphically the 
destinations covered by the Boeing 737 fleet. The fleet is used mainly to cover domestic 
destinations in the United States. In addition, it flies to Canada (Toronto and Montreal), 
Central America and the Caribbean. There are 233 flight legs for the daily problem and 1589 
flights legs for the weekly problem. 
Figure 5.5: Geographic plot of the flights legs and destinations of the fleet 
On geographic plot, Miami or Fort Lauderdale initially appears to be a hub for this fleet, 
because a significant number of flight legs are connected to these airports. However, this 
impression comes from the fact that the plot does not represent the frequency of each flight 
leg. If we look at the most active airport, it turns out to be Dallas. 
5.3.1.3. More about the RAVE Optimizer 
To implement some of the robust crew scheduling ideas discussed, we used the Carmen 
RAVE optimizer. This software (RAVE stands for "Rule and VAlue Evaluator") is currently 
used by 20 airlines and three railway companies. It enables us to solve large scale problems; 
however, one downside is that the software does not allow us to implement the robust models 
exactly as presented above. Instead, we use the general ideas of these models and incorporate 
them into our approach by manipulating the basic crew pairing's cost function, as follows: 
subject to 
The Rave optimizer minimizes the cost function and ensures that all flight legs are covered. 
All pairings formed respect FAA and airline rules that are coded in the optimization tool. The 
optimizer calculates the cost for all these pairings and selects the cost minimizing set. 
All pairings are represented in the graphic environment (Figure 5.6), enabling planners to 
manipulate and modify them as desired. For example, planners might protect, that is, require 
some good pairings to be contained in the optimizer's solution. 
Figure 5.6: Screen shot of Carmen Crew Pairing optimizer 
5. 3.1. 4. Limitations 
Our analysis is limited by two factors. First, aircraft routings are fixed and second, we cannot 
modify the cost function; we can only add penalties to the costs of the pairings in the model. 
As a consequence, we create penalties that capture our model's objective to maximize the use 
of short connects and the objective of Agbokou7s model to select robust routings and crew 
pairings. In Table 5.2, we compare these models and present our modifications to these 
formulations. 
Table 5.2: Comparison and Adaptation of the models 
5 .3.2.  Implementation of the "Maximization of the short connects" model 
5.3.  2.1. Adaptation 
We need to adapt our model to the Carmen Crew Pairing software. Therefore, to maximize 
the number of short connects and have crews stay with their aircraft instead of changing 
aircraft between flights, we place a penalty whenever a crew makes an aircraft change 
between flights. 
Penalty of the 
pairing in RAVE 
We give a penalty 
for each aircraft 
change in the 
pairing 
We give a penalty 
for each critical 
connection in the 
pairing 
Objective 
Crew to follow their 
plane the maximum 
number of times 
Crew either to stay 
with the plane or to 
have enough time to 
connect between 
aircraft (more than 
lhour 15) 
Our approach 
Integrated 
Robust 
Routing and 
Crew Model 
(Agbokou) 
Advantages of the 
model 
The criterion 
guarantees a strong 
level of robustness 
Tight crew 
connections 
between different 
aircraft are replaced 
by short connects or 
long connections 
Robustness 
Criteria 
Maximize the 
number of short 
connects 
Minimize the 
number of 
critical 
connections 
5.3.2.2. Results 
We solve this model for the weekly problem for the American Airlines Boeing 737 fleet, 
involving 1589 flight legs. By varying the penalty placed on an aircraft change, we were able 
to obtain solutions with different numbers of aircraft changes and hence different crew costs. 
In computing crew costs, we did not include the penalty costs placed on aircraft changes by 
crews, thereby ensuring that our cost comparisons were valid. We were therefore able to 
examine the effect of the number of aircraft changes on crew cost. 
Table 5.3: Crew cost and Aircraft change in the weekly problem 
Baseline Model 
Penalty-$0.5 
Penalty - $2.50 
Penalty - $5 
Penalty - $25 
Penalty - $50 
In Table 5.3, we present our findings. Crew costs correspond to the weekly cost of the set of 
pairings selected to cover the 1589 flights leg of the schedule. This calculation is based on the 
hypothesis that the next week's schedule is exactly the same, which might not be the case at 
the end or at the beginning of the month. 
The number of duty days represents the number of pilot days needed for covering all the legs. 
If this number increases, it means that each pilot flies less on average. 
Crew Costs 
$1,6 17,199 
$1,617,238 
$1,617,404 
$1,617,563 
$1,618,353 
$1,620,298 
Number of 
Duty Days 
2018 
2072 
21 12 
2070 
2130 
2138 
1 leg 
Duty 
555 
592 
620 
603 
636 
643 
Percentage Change in 
crew costs compared 
to the baseline 
-- 
0.002% 
0.013% 
0.023% 
0.07 1 % 
0.192% 
Aircraft 
Changes 
336 
32 1 
304 
293 
239 
227 
Percentage 
Change 
-- 
-4.464% 
-9.524% 
I 
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-28.869% 
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Figure 5.7: Trade off between aircraft changes and crew cost increase 
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At first glance, the results of Figure 5.7, that a 0.2% increase in the crew costs can generate a 
gain of 32.4% in robustness by decreasing the number of aircraft connections, are quite 
remarkable. However, by further examination of the data, this impressive result is tempered 
by the fact that we have at the same time an increase in the Duty Days (that is, the total 
number of pilots needed to cover the schedule), especially in the number of 1 leg crew duties. 
More details are provided in Table 6.2. 
150 -. 
100 
50 
0 -. 
. - - --- - - - - -- -- - - 
- - - - - - - - - --- - - . - - - - --- - 
--  
--- . - -- 
I I I 
Table 5.4. : Aircraft changes, shorts connects and number of legs per duty 
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Figure 5.8: Correlation between decrease in aircraft changes and increase in 1-leg duty 
Correlation between decrease in aircraft changes and 
increase in 1-leg duty 
1 00 
In Figure 5.8, we show the correlation between the number of reductions in crew connections 
between different aircraft and the number of increases in 1-leg duties. We conclude that most 
of the connections between different aircraft were eliminated by splitting the duty at the 
connection into two and assigning two crews. 
>, 90 -- 
Replacing these connections between aircraft are short connects, with the number of aircraft 
connections decreasing by 32%, the number of short connects increased by: 25%. 
- -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
The drawback of this solution is that it requires 6% more pilots to fly the same schedule. 
Therefore, the value of this approach depends on how crew are paid. We don't include in our 
model the additional compensation crews receive when they don't fly. Instead, we consider 
only crew costs related to total assigned block time. In our solution, this block time expense 
increases by only 0.2% . 
The need to have more crew has associated costs that are difficult for us to quantify. 
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5.3.3. Implementation of the Agbokou model 
5.3.3.1. Adaptation 
In our adaptation of Agbokou's model, we discourage the use of critical connections in the 
crew pairing solution by placing a penalty on each critical connection. We evaluated this 
model using data representing the daily problem for the American Airlines Boeing 737 fleet, 
involving 240 flight legs. . 
All the critical crew connections are not equivalent. Indeed, a critical crew connection 45 
minutes after the scheduled anival time is more likely to be disrupted than a critical crew 
connection 1 hour and 15 minutes later. Therefore, we consider 5 cases, each of which has a 
different shape for the penalty placed on critical crew connections. Figure 5.9 shows a plot of 
the penalty for each case. 
Figure 5.9: Five different Penalty shapes 
Case 1 (0 penalty): This is the baseline case. There is no penalty for the critical connection. 
Cases 2 and 4 (linear): The critical connection penalty is linear starting from $500 and $1500 
respectively for Cases 2 and 4. The penalty is highest when the connection time is 45 minutes 
(minimum connection time) and it decreases linearly with time until the connection time is 1 
hour 15 minutes, where the penalty is $0. By definition, a connection beyond 1 hour 15 
minutes is not a critical connection. 
(1 : 15 - C~nnectionTime,~, ) 
Crit Cost , - c Penaltyx 
leg€ pairing 30 
Cases 3 and 5 (linear special): In addition to being a linear function of time from the 
minimum connection time (as per Cases 2 and 4), the penalty on a critical connection is also a 
function of the number of flight legs left in the duty after the critical connection. We have 
illustrated how critical connections are undesirable because a flight delay is likely to cause a 
crew to delay their next flight or worse, miss it. In addition, this effect is propagated to the 
additional flights the crew has remaining in its duty. Therefore, in order to improve the 
robustness of the crew schedule, it is desirable to limit critical connections to those with fewer 
remaining flight legs. The penalty cost function in Cases 3 and 5 accounts for this by 
multiplying the penalty by the number of flights remaining in the duty. 
(1 : 15 - C~nnectionTime,~~ ) 
Crit Cost ,,.,, = x x Penaltyx x Re mainingFlightLegs, 
durn pairing leg€ duty 30 
5.3.3.2.  Results 
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Figure 5.10: Number and length of critical connections used, for varying penalty 
functions 
The Figure 5.10 shows the number and length of critical connections used in the solution, for 
the different penalty functions. The objective of the different penalties was to increasingly 
push out of the solution those critical connections with a small amount of connecting time. It 
works fairly well and we see that the optimizer was able to reduce the number of critical 
connections between 45 and 50 minutes from 18 to 5, which can represent a significant gain 
in robustness. 
Number of fligh legs in duty after a CC 
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Figure 5.11: Number of Flight legs in duty after a Critical Connection 
We observe in Figures 5.10 and 5.1 1 that the introduction of the penalties on critical 
connections as well as on the number of flights remaining pushes the optimizer to select crew 
schedules in which the duration of the critical connection is maximized and the number of 
flight legs after the critical connection is minimized. 
Using Figures 5.10 and 5.11, we describe the results we obtain case by case. 
Case 1 is the baseline case without any penalty. We have 26 critical connections among the 
49 aircraft changes. In this crew schedule, we observe that there are a large number of 
connections between 45 and 50 minutes. Furthermore, there is one critical connection which 
has three flight legs remaining. Therefore, this crew schedule is not very robust. 
Cases 2 and 4 are the cases in which the penalty on a critical connection takes a higher value 
with no penalty on the number of flights remaining in the duty after the critical connection. 
Referring to the plots, we observe that the number of critical connections between 45 and 50 
minutes has decreased. Robustness is improved in these cases. 
In Cases 3 and 5, in addition to a penalty on critical connections, there is also a penalty on the 
number of flights remaining in the duty after the critical connection. We observe that this 
penalty, as expected, pushed the optimizer to select a solution that seems more robust than 
Cases 1,2, and 4. 
We also note that the aim is not to get rid of all the critical connections. If you break certain 
critical connections, cost savings might not be achieved because they are unlikely to lead to 
delays. Therefore, we essentially seek to find a tradeoff between robustness of the solution 
(and savings in recovery) and savings in the planned operations. 
Concerning the cost of the solution, the costs associated with all solutions are within 1% of 
the cost of $298,714.5 for the baseline case. 
5.3.4. Conclusions 
We adapted 2 optimization models, our model and that of Agbokou [I] to study their benefits 
in terms of reducing delays resulting from crews. 
The advantage of the Agbokou model adapted to this problem is the possibility to give a 
shape to the penalty depending on the connection time and the number of flight legs left in the 
duty. It would also be possible to add some parameters like the expected delay of the flight, or 
airport congestion levels. 
We conclude that many crew solutions exist within 1% of the baseline optimal cost. Hence, 
there are opportunities to find near-optimal solutions that are more robust than those being 
generated with conventional models that ignore robustness. Hence, generating robust crew 
schedules can potentially reduce the 18 % of the non-system delays that are related to crews, 
without excessive costs to the airlines. 
However, our solution requires 6% more pilots to fly the schedule for a 25% increase in short 
connection utilization. Hence, our estimation of an associated 0.2% cost increase should be 
augmented to include the costs to compensate pilots for non-flying duty time. These costs 
represent an important part of crew costs that are airline dependent. We are unable, however, 
to compute these costs. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
6.1. Summary 
Delays and congestion are certain to grow in the near future with the increasing trend of 
air traffic. This study analyzes delay trends and proposes and evaluates new models aimed at 
reducing delays caused by crews. We begin this thesis by conducting an analysis of current 
delays in the airline industry, followed by a discussion of some of the measures airlines are 
taking to maintain on-time performance, and we end with a review, implementation and 
evaluation of crew scheduling models aimed at achieving increased reliability. 
In chapter 2, we present a broad picture of the delays in the US. We examine the causes as 
reported by airlines and by the US Department of Transportation. 90% of delays stem from 
the 3 following sources: the National Aviation System, the Air Camer, delay propagation 
(aircraft amving late). From the airline viewpoint, more than 70% of the delays are caused by 
the system, with airlines having little to no control over these delays. The causes of system 
delays include weather, heavy traffic volume, and closed runways. We compute that weather 
itself is directly responsible for 48.7% of the U.S. flight delays. 
In our study, we show that delays don't appear totally at random in the system. Instead there 
are yearly variations in some performance indicators, including on-time arrivals and taxi-out 
times; seasonal variations in delays and cancellation; and daily variations in the causes of 
delays. The 10% of US airports that serve 65% of the air traffic display similar on-time 
performance to that of smaller airports, but experience much greater taxi-out times (6 minutes 
on average), reflecting high levels of congestion at these large airports. 
In chapter 3, we study Delta Airline's de-banking of their Atlanta hub in response to 
increased delays and inability to execute the flight schedule as planned. With de-banking, 
Delta has removed their banks in Atlanta and spread-out flight departures and arrivals 
throughout the day. The key performance indicators show that de-peaking has had positive 
effects on the operations of Delta, and generally spealung, on all airport operations, even 
taking into account that the on-time arrival rate of the competitors decreased. The on-time 
percentage of Delta increased and taxi-out times decreased. Although de-banking 
theoretically reduces the number of opportunities to swap airplanes at peak hours, Delta 
compensated for this by adding more flights so that more aircraft are on the ground at the 
same time. 
In chapter 4, we discuss an approach widely utilized by the airlines to gain on-time 
performance, namely: ad&ng buffer time to scheduled operations to gain robustness and 
improve on-time performance. Our case study involving flights from Atlanta to Dallas show 
different practices and accomplishments among the 3 airlines that serve this market. 
American Airlines adds the most amount of buffer time and Airtran the least. However, the 
on-time performance of American Airlines is disappointing, not because of its tight bad 
schedule, but instead because long taxi-in times result from gate unavailability. We present 
least square regression and the Robust Majorize-Minimize approach to evaluate and compare 
the airlines' buffering practices. Some airlines, like United Airlines, Airtran and Continental, 
underestimated the need for buffer times at Boston Logan in January 2005, a period in which 
extreme weather severely dsrupted operations at Logan. 
In chapter 5, we review different robust scheduling models specifically targeted to 
decrease delay propagation. We propose a model, aimed at reducing delays caused by crews, 
that minimizes the number of times crews must transfer between different aircraft during their 
workday. From our implementation and evaluation of two different models, each with an 
objective to reduce delays resulting from crew unavailability, we conclude that an increase of 
0.2% in crew costs could enable a decrease of 32% in the number of times crew must transfer 
between aircraft during their workday and an increase by 25% in the number of times a crew 
continues on the same aircraft. 
6.2. Future Research 
In this study we illustrate potential improvements in schedule reliability that are attainable 
with robust scheduling approaches, without incurring large increases in crew costs. A further 
study could address evaluate, using historical data, how much schedule non-robustness affects 
realized costs as compared to planned costs. This would shed light on how optimization 
models should be formulated to ensure that realized, and not planned, costs are minimized. 
This suggests another important direction of research: how to integrate robustness 
considerations into the schedule planning optimization process. There are many associated 
questions, including is it profitable to cater to time-sensitive passengers and if so, how should 
airline schedules be structured and how should resources by deployed to achieve on-time 
performance? 

References 
[I] Agbokou, B. (2004) "Robust Airline Schedule Planning: Review and Development of 
Optimization Approaches" SM Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
[2]: Airport Capacity Benchmark Report (2004) 
http:/h~~.faa.gov/events/benchmark~/2OO4do~nload. htm 
[3] Barnhart, Cohn, Johnson, Klabjan, Nemhauser and Vance (2002) "Airline Crew 
Scheduling" Handbook of Transportation Science, Chapter 14 
[4] Bogusch, L. (2003) "Rethinking the Hub and Spoke Airline Strategy: An Analysis and 
Discussion of American Airlines's Decision to De-peak its Schedule at O'Hare International" 
SM Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
[5] BTS (2005) "Airline On-Time Performance and Causes of Flight Delays" 
http:/hww. bts.gov/help/aviation. hhnl 
[6]: Booz-Allen & Hamilton (2001) "Punctuality: How Airlines Can Improve On-Time 
Perfonnance?'Airline consultants 
[7] Carmen Systems Crew Paring software 
www. carmen. se/airg roducts/pdf/air-crewjairing. pdf 
[a] Credeur M.J. Operation Clockwork radical, risky (2005) American City Business Journals 
Inc. 
[9] Ehrgott and Ryan (2002), Constructing robust crew schedules with bicriteria optimization. 
Journal of Multi- Criteria Decision Analysis 1 l(3): 139- 150, 2002. 
[ 101 Insightful Corporation (200 1). "S-Plus 6 for Windows User' s Guide". Znsighrful 
Corporation, Seattle, Washington, July 2001. 
[l 11 Klabjan, Chebalov (2002) "Robust Airline Crew Scheduling: Move-up crews" 
Proceedings of the 2002 NSF Design, Service, and Manufacturing Grantees and Research 
Conference. 
https://netfiles. uiuc. edu/klabjanhvww/proceedings/ns~2.pdf 
[12] LaMont R (2004) "Airline Maintenance Outsourcing: Savings at Any Cost, Putting 
Safety At Risk While Exporting High-Paying American Jobs" 
http:/hww.amfa4.org/Outsourcing2. htm 
[13]: Maynard (2005) "Will the Flight Be on Time? It's Anybody's Guess", New York Times, 
August 08 2005 
[14] Noether (199 1). "Introduction to Statistics the Nonparametric Way" Springer-Verlag, 
New York, NY. 
[15] The MITRE Corporation (2005) "Scenario B-Congestion Due to En Route Severe 
Weather" 
http://www.mitrecaasd. orghork/project-details. cfm ?item-id= I39 
[16] United Airlines (2005) "Airport Operation United Airlines fact sheet" 
ht tp: /~w.ca trave l sma~.  com/UA %2OFact%2OSheet. htm 
[17] Zhang, Y., M. Menendez, and M. Hansen, (2004) "Analysis of De-peaking Strategies 
Implemented by American Airlines: Causes and Effects" TRB National Conference . 
